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LAY REPRESENTATION BEFORE BUREAU OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION HELD UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW
Special Master Comm'rs v. McCahan
83 Ohio L. Abs. I (C.P. 1960)
Can a lay person represent claimants before the administrative tribunals
of the Ohio Bureau of Workmen's Compensation? The Stark County Com-
mon Pleas Court was faced with this query when the Special Master Com-
missioners, appointed by the same court to investigate unauthorized practice
of law in the county, brought injunctive proceedings against the respondent.
According to the court's findings of fact, the respondent had, for eighteen
years, selected and prepared workmen's compensation forms for claimants,
advised claimants of their rights under the law, attended hearings in a
representative capacity, and effected the final disposition of claimants' legal
rights under the Ohio workmen's compensation laws. Upon appeals taken
to the Industrial Commission at Columbus, respondent's contracted claims
were handled by a Columbus attorney with whom he had association. Sitting
en banc, the three-judge court found that respondent's activities did con-
stitute the practice of law and enjoined him "from all such actions and
conduct."
Despite the restricted impact of the decree (not appealed and applicable
only to the respondent), it has aroused interest among the organized Bar
as a valuable precedent for those committees charged with the responsibility
of curbing activities constituting the unauthorized practice of law.' For
Ohio, the case was one of significance because it is the first to answer the
question (posed above) since the major overhaul in 1955 of the workmen's
compensation laws.2 The current law is confused, and the need for clarifi-
cation is great.
The Ohio statutes are silent as to the qualifications for a person appear-
ing before the workmen's compensation tribunals in a representative capacity,
except for Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.05 which gives the Industrial Commission
the power to adopt "reasonable and proper rules" to facilitate the hearings.
The last attempt by the Commission to regulate the practice by representa-
tives was in February, 1953. 3 The rules then required a license, to be issued
if a prospective representative could demonstrate that he was 18 years of
age, a citizen of good moral character with five character references, and
possessed a knowledge of the law.4 In practice today, no license is re-
quired and seldom, if ever, are the representatives of any party to a hearing
1 Stark County Bar Assoc. v. McCahan, 29 Vol. 26, U.P. News, No. 1, p. 28
(Spring, 1960).
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 4121.12.
3 Rules for Practice Before the Industrial Commission of Ohio, p. 5 (Feb. 1, 1953).
4 Ibid.
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asked their qualifications. "The Bureau and the Industrial Commission do
not require representation nor do they interfere with representation."
5
Notwithstanding Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.05, the Ohio Supreme Court
has stated that the judiciary has the inherent power "to regulate, control,
and define the practice of law."6
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings and the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition conveyancing, the preparation of legal in-
struments of all kinds, and in general all advice to clients and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law.
7
Utilizing the principle that sustains the above case, the Ohio Supreme Court
declared in Goodmnan v. Beall in 1936:
One appearing or practicing before the Industrial Commission of
Ohio in a representative capacity subsequent to the time a claimant
first receives notice of the disallowance of his claim under Sec.
1465-90, General Code, is engaged in the practice of law, and pro-
hibition will lie against such commission to prevent the appearance
or practice before it on rehearing proceedings of any person other
than an attorney at law, duly admitted to practice.8
However, this decision does not control today since its statutory basis
has been completely renovated by the Ohio legislature. The court in 1936
was most impressed by provisions of the Ohio Gen. Code §§ 1465-90, which
distinguished the non-adversary nature of the original hearing from the
rehearing which was conducted "as in the trial of civil actions." Their hold-
ing in the case established a boundary between the two hearings for a lay
representative, beyond which he could not pursue his contract claims.
Today the chain of allowance hearings has become much more complex
with the addition of other appeal stages. An employer or employee may
initiate a claim by making application to the Bureau of Workmen's Com-
pensation on a standard form kept by all covered employers.9 The ad-
ministrator (Deputy) will then order an investigation,'0 and make a tenta-
tive award on the basis of any "compensable" injury found." The employer
has 10 days in which to object; 1 2 if he does object, the administrator will
docket the claim for hearing.13 At this hearing, the administrator must al-
5 Handbook for Employees and Employers, Workmen's Compensation Act of the
State of Ohio, p. 12 (1958).
6 Judd v. City Trust & Savings, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
7 Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650
(1934).
8 Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936).
0 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.07.
10 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.512.
11 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.514.
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.514.
13 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.515.
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low "testimony and facts pertinent to the claim" to be presented, but does
not need to prepare a record.14 Following this decision, either party may
request "reconsideration" by the Administrator, 5 or appeal as a matter or
right to the regional board of review where the "testimony of witnesses and
other evidence" may be introduced.' 6 The decision of the regional board of
review constitutes the decision of the Commission unless an appeal is ac-
cepted by the Industrial Commission itself, at Columbus.17
The procedure is further complicated by Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.519
which allows appeals to be taken to the courts of common pleas. Effective
November 2, 1959, a claimant may appeal an administrator's decision to
the courts when an application for reconsideration is denied by the Ad-
ministrator; and either the claimant or the employer may appeal to the
courts from an adverse ruling by a regional board of review.
The reason for this elaboration of procedure is to distinguish the com-
plex procedure under present law from that forming the basis of Goodman
v. Beall,'8 where there was only a hearing and a rehearing. To prevent the
misapprehension that the Stark County Common Pleas Court could logically
have drawn an arbitrary line between the original allowance hearing,
the "reconsideration" hearing, or the hearing before a regional board, it
should be noted that, aside from the appeal mentioned above, a "settlement"
can be recommended to the Industrial Commission directly by an adminis-
trator upon application by the parties. 19 Such a settlement made pursuant
to the rules and regulations of the Commission operates like any other settle-
ment between the parties, including the state fund.
The result of the foregoing analysis of the Ohio statutes precludes any
selection of a boundary line between the various hearings which would not
be completely arbitrary. The representation of parties at the hearings of
the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation must, therefore, be held to consti-
tute either the practice of law in its entirety, or not at all.
To hold that none of the practice within the Bureau is the practice of
law would be a withdrawal from the position taken by most other jurisdic-
tions. 20 Nevertheless, support for this position did emanate from the framers
of the workmen's compensation laws.21 The Ohio Supreme Court has recog-
nized that article II, section 35, Ohio Constitution (authorizing the establish-
ment of workmen's compensation) was proposed because "it assures every
worker compensation for injuries or death arising out of and in the course
of employment, backed by state law and state administration without
necessity for recourse to law suits or employment of attorneys or payment
14 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.515.
15 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.515.
16 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.518.
17 Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.516.
18 Supra note 8.
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 4121.121(J).
20 Annot., 111 A.L.R. 19 (1937); cf. Annot., 125 A.L.R. 1173 (1940); cf. Annot.,
151 A.L.R. 781 (1944).
21 35 Mich. L. Rev. 442 (1937).
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of court costs."'22 This view presupposes that the practice is simple enough
to allow a claimant to process his own claim from inception to final settle-
ment; however, the procedure for allowance hearings alone would be over-
whelming to most uninitiated without assistance from some source. The
State of Ohio embarked upon an educational program in 1958 via press
releases featuring questions and answers, but it must be considered that in
that same year, there were 3,200,000 covered employees throughout the
state.2 3 763 employees of the Bureau cannot effectively counsel 343,187
claimants within a one-year period without outside assistance in the form
of expert representation of the parties.
24
Considering that all 50 states and the federal government have similar
programs; 25 that 39-40 million workers were protected by such legislation
during an average week of 1955 ;26 that Ohio requires 16 district offices, 5
regional boards of review, plus the Industrial Commission itself in Columbus
to administer its law; it can be said that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
spoke with wisdom when it stated:
There has been such an enormous development in recent years of
administrative and quasi judicial boards of all kinds, that, unless
their proceedings and decisions are guided by persons learned in
the history, development, and philosophy of legal principles, the
decline may be very rapid from government characterized by su-
premacy of law to one of haphazard and arbitrary rule-a degenera-
tion from liberty to oppression.2 7
Regardless of one's opinion on the merits of the controversy, i.e.,
whether such representation is the practice of law, due to the interrelation
of the procedural steps delineated above, it is imperative that the Ohio
courts refrain from drawing an arbitrary line somewhere within the frame-
work. This representation must entail either the practice of law from start
to finish, or not at all.
Edgar A. Bircher
22 Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 429 (1936).
23 Third Report of the Workmen's Compensation Advisory Council, State of Ohio
(Feb. 11, 1959).
24 First Report of the Workmen's Compensation Advisory Council, State of Ohio
(Feb. 5, 1957).
25 U.S. Dep't of Labor Bulletin 161 (Rev.), August, 1957.
26 Ibid.
27 Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 Ati. 20 (1937).
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